Philosophical Studies 165 (3):841-863 (2013)
Could interacting mindreaders be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers? This paper argues that they could. Mindreading is sometimes reciprocal: the mindreader’s target reciprocates by taking the mindreader as a target for mindreading. The paper explains how such reciprocity can significantly narrow the range of possible interpretations of behaviour where mindreaders are, or appear to be, in a position to interact. A consequence is that revisions and extensions are needed to standard theories of the evidential basis of mindreading. The view also has consequences for understanding how abilities to interact combined with comparatively simple forms of mindreading may explain the emergence, in evolution or development, of sophisticated forms of social cognition
|Keywords||Mindreading Theory of mind Joint action Interpretation Goal ascription Interaction Social cognition|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Joint Action: Bodies and Minds Moving Together.Natalie Sebanz, Harold Bekkering & Günther Knoblich - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):70-76.
False-Belief Understanding in Infants.Renée Baillargeon, Rose M. Scott & Zijing He - 2010 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):110-118.
Do Humans Have Two Systems to Track Beliefs and Belief-Like States?Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (4):953-970.
Citations of this work BETA
Social Cognition in the We-Mode.Mattia Gallotti & Chris Frith - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):160-165.
Inferentialism and Our Knowledge of Others’ Minds.William E. S. McNeill - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1435-1454.
Introduction: Empathy and Collective Intentionality—The Social Philosophy of Edith Stein.Thomas Szanto & Dermot Moran - 2015 - Human Studies 38 (4):445-461.
Individualism Versus Interactionism About Social Understanding.Judith Martens & Tobias Schlicht - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
What’s so Special About Interaction in Social Cognition?Julius Schönherr - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):181-198.
Similar books and articles
Action, Mindreading and Embodied Social Cognition.Joshua Shepherd - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):507-518.
Ian Apperly, Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of Theory of Mind. [REVIEW]Wayne Christensen & John Michael - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):907-914.
A Critique of Embodied Simulation.Shannon Spaulding - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):579-599.
Mirror Neurons Are Not Evidence for the Simulation Theory.Shannon Spaulding - 2012 - Synthese 189 (3):515-534.
The Phenomenal Mindreader: A Case for Phenomenal Simulation.Stephen Biggs - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):29-42.
Interactionism and Mindreading.John Michael - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):559-578.
Embodying the False-Belief Tasks.Michael Wilby - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):519-540.
How “Weak” Mindreaders Inherited the Earth.Cameron Buckner, Adam Shriver, Stephen Crowley & Colin Allen - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):140-141.
Editorial: Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives.Daniel D. Hutto, Mitchell Herschbach & Victoria Southgate - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):375-395.
Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of "Theory of Mind".Ian Apperly - 2010 - Psychology Press.
Rethinking the Ontogeny of Mindreading.Maurizio Tirassa, Francesca M. Bosco & Livia Colle - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):197-217.
Added to index2012-06-20
Total downloads240 ( #15,172 of 2,178,143 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #54,729 of 2,178,143 )
How can I increase my downloads?