Philosophical Quarterly 61 (246):23-47 (2012)
Given the premise that joint action plays some role in explaining how humans come to understand minds, what could joint action be? Not what a leading account, Michael Bratman's, says it is. For on that account engaging in joint action involves sharing intentions and sharing intentions requires much of the understanding of minds whose development is supposed to be explained by appeal to joint action. This paper therefore offers an account of a different kind of joint action, an account compatible with the premise about development. The new account is no replacement for the leading account; rather the accounts characterise two kinds of joint action. Where the kind of joint characterised by the leading account involves shared intentions, the new account characterises a kind of joint action involving shared goals
|Keywords||joint action shared intention collective intentionality development action|
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Citations of this work BETA
Shared Intention and the Doxastic Single End Condition.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):351-372.
The Sense of Commitment: A Minimal Approach.John Michael, Natalie Sebanz & Günther Knoblich - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention.Facundo M. Alonso - 2016 - Journal of Social Ontology 2 (2):271–302.
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