Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):233 - 249 (2012)
Earl Conee and Richard Feldman claim that mentalism identifies the core of internalist epistemology. This is what I call identifying ur-internalism. Their version of ur-internalism differs from the traditional one ? viz., accessibilism ? by not imposing requirements stipulating that subjects must have reflective access to facts which justify their beliefs for these beliefs to be justified. Instead, justification simply supervenes on the mental lives of subjects. I argue that mentalism fails to establish itself as ur-internalism by demonstrating that the strong supervenience claim used by Conee and Feldman is consistent with cognitive externalism (often called ?the extended mind hypothesis?). Briefly, cognitive externalism claims that the mental states themselves (rather than their contents) constitutively depend on factors outside the bodily individual. Given this possibility, I claim Conee and Feldman's supervenience principle no longer suits the purposes to which they put it
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension.Andy Clark - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Dewey on Extended Cognition and Epistemology.Krist Vaesen - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):426-438.
Similar books and articles
Internalism Defended.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2001 - In Hilary Kornblith (ed.), American Philosophical Quarterly. Blackwell. pp. 1 - 18.
Reconciling Justificatory Internalism and Content Externalism.Chris Tillman - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):419-440.
On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism.B. J. C. Madison - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (3):173-183.
Externally Enhanced Internalism.Earl Conee - 2007 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 51--67.
Epistemic Supervenience and Internalism: A Trilemma.Colin Ruloff - 2009 - Theoria 75 (2):129-151.
An Argument That Internalism Requires Infallibility.Alan Sidelle - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):163-179.
Externalism, Internalism, and Knowledge of Content.Keith Butler - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):773-800.
Why Justification Matters.Declan Smithies - 2015 - In David Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 224-244.
Added to index2012-05-22
Total downloads41 ( #124,857 of 2,158,346 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #355,511 of 2,158,346 )
How can I increase my downloads?