On benefiting from injustice

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):129-152 (2007)

Daniel Butt
Oxford University
How do we acquire moral obligations to others? The most straightforward cases are those where we acquire obligations as the result of particular actions which we voluntarily perform. If I promise you that I will trim your hedge, I face a moral Obligation to uphold my promise, and in the absence of some morally significant countervailing reason, I should indeed cut your hedge. Moral obligations which arise as a result of wrongdoing, as a function of corrective justice, are typically thought to be of a similar nature.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0045-5091
DOI 10.1353/cjp.2007.0010
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References found in this work BETA

Distributing Responsibilities.David Miller - 2001 - Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (4):453–471.
Superseding Historic Injustice.Jeremy Waldron - 1992 - Ethics 103 (1):4-28.
Superseding Historic Injustice.Waldron Jeremy - 1992 - Ethics 103 (1):4-28.
Ancient Wrongs and Modern Rights.George Sher - 1981 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1):3-17.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Ethical Basis for Veganism.Tristram McPherson - 2018 - In Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson & Tyler Doggett (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Unethical Consumption & Obligations to Signal.Holly Lawford-Smith - 2015 - Ethics and International Affairs 29 (3):315-330.

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