Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):31-56 (2007)
This paper presents arguments against two crucial elements of recent versions of the Two-Worlds interpretation of Plato. I argue first that in addition to knowledge of the forms, Plato allows beliefs about them as well. Then I argue that Plato sees knowledge as a state in which the subject is conscious of information about the forms. Thus, the infallibility of knowledge must be understood in a way that is consistent with its being informational. Finally, I argue that my conclusions about knowledge do not preclude the possibility that cognition of forms has a direct, nonrepresentational aspect
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy General Interest|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Wisdom, Moderation, and Elenchus in Plato's Apology.Christopher S. King - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (3):345–362.
Platonic Knowledge and the Standard Analysis.Lloyd P. Gerson - 2006 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (4):455 – 474.
Aristotle's Two Worlds: Knowledge and Belief inPosterior Analytics 1.33.Gail Fine - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (3pt3):323-346.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads41 ( #123,194 of 2,152,501 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #162,806 of 2,152,501 )
How can I increase my downloads?