Reconstructing Experience

International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):291-308 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper explores the role that willing plays in Fichte’s transcendental idealism, as set out in the nova methodo lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre and elsewhere. I first consider the link between the idea of the self-positing I and freedom, as well as the bifurcation of the I into cognition and volition. I then pinpoint the significance of intellectual intuition as part of Fichte’s strategy of substantiating the actuality of freedom via practical reason, especially in relation to the way in which our capacity for self-determination conditions our knowledge-claims about nature. Finally I indicate that the will is essential for intuitional experience, which entails the ability to distinguish pure willing from empirical willing. In this context, I argue that, for Fichte, willing is constitutive of the possibility of consciousnessin general, and the possibility of determinate knowledge in particular.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,745

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles


Added to PP

21 (#173,985)

6 months
9 (#1,260,759)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references