Towards a Mechanistically Neutral Account of Acting Jointly: The Notion of a Collective Goal

Mind 132 (525):1-29 (2022)
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Abstract

Many of the things we do are, or could be, done with others. Mundane examples favoured by philosophers include painting a house together (Bratman 1992), li.

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original Butterfill, Stephen Andrew; Sinigaglia, Corrado (forthcoming) "Towards a mechanistically neutral account of acting jointly : the notion of a collective goal". ():

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Author Profiles

Stephen Andrew Butterfill
University of Warwick
Corrado Sinigaglia
Università degli Studi di Milano

Citations of this work

How to be minimalist about shared agency.Jules Salomone-Sehr - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):155-178.

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References found in this work

Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Linguistic behaviour.Jonathan Bennett - 1976 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Collective Intentions and Actions.John Searle - 1990 - In Philip R. Cohen Jerry Morgan & Martha Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication. MIT Press. pp. 401-415.

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