Analysis 66 (290):130–135 (2006)
No-futurists ('growing block theorists') hold that that the past and the present are real, but that the future is not. The present moment is therefore privileged: it is the last moment of time. Craig Bourne (2002) and David Braddon-Mitchell (2004) have argued that this position is unmotivated, since the privilege of presentness comes apart from the indexicality of 'this moment'. I respond that no-futurists should treat 'x is real-as-of y' as a nonsymmetric relation. Then different moments are real-as-of different times. This reunites privilege with indexicality, but entails that no-futurists must believe in ineliminably tensed facts.
|Keywords||No-futurism Growing block Hybrid views of time|
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References found in this work BETA
The Real but Dead Past: A Reply to Braddon-Mitchell.Peter Forrest - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):358–362.
When Am I? A Tense Time for Some Tense Theorists?C. Bourne - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):359 – 371.
A Defense of Mctaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time.Michael Dummett - 1960 - Philosophical Review 69 (4):497-504.
Citations of this work BETA
Every Now and Then, No-Futurism Faces No Sceptical Problems.Tim Button - 2007 - Analysis 67 (296):325–332.
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