The Weight of Truth: Lessons for Minimalists from Russell's Gray's Elegy Argument

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):261-289 (2014)
Authors
Tim Button
Cambridge University
Abstract
Minimalists, such as Paul Horwich, claim that the notions of truth, reference and satisfaction are exhausted by some very simple schemes. Unfortunately, there are subtle difficulties with treating these as schemes, in the ordinary sense. So instead, minimalists regard them as illustrating one-place functions, into which we can input propositions (when considering truth) or propositional constituents (when considering reference and satisfaction). However, Bertrand Russell's Gray's Elegy argument teaches us some important lessons about propositions and propositional constituents. When applied to minimalism, these lessons show us why we should abandon it
Keywords Truth  Minimalism  Gray's Elegy  Reference  Satisfaction  Paul Horwich  Deflationism  Disquotationalism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2014.00373.x
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References found in this work BETA

On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.
The Structure and Content of Truth.Donald Davidson - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (6):279-328.
A Defense Of Minimalism.Paul Horwich - 2001 - Synthese 126 (1):149-165.
The Folly of Trying to Define Truth.Donald Davidson - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (6):263-278.

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