Deflationism and the primary truth bearer
Synthese 173 (3):281 - 297 (2010)
Abstract
The paper discusses what kind of truth bearer, or truth-ascription, a deflationist should take as primary. I first present number of arguments against a sententialist view. I then present a deflationary theory which takes propositions as primary, and try to show that it deals neatly with a wide range of linguistic data. Next, I consider both the view that there is no primary truth bearer, and the most common account of sentence truth given by deflationists who take propositions as primary, and argue that they both attribute an implausible type of ambiguity to “true”. This can be avoided, however, if truth-ascriptions to sentences are taken as a certain form of pragmatic ellipses. I end by showing how this hypothesis accommodates a number of intuitions involving truth-ascriptions to sentences.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s11229-008-9428-1
My notes
Similar books and articles
The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns.Glen Hoffmann - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):938-949.
New wave deflationism.Nic Damnjanovic - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 45--58.
The Inconsistency of Deflationary Truth and Davidsonian Meaning.Kari Middleton - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:99-103.
Leave Truth Alone: On Deflationism and Contextualism.Daniel Whiting - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):607-624.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-01-28
Downloads
698 (#12,688)
6 months
76 (#13,838)
2009-01-28
Downloads
698 (#12,688)
6 months
76 (#13,838)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
In Defence of Radical Restrictionism.David Liggins - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):3-25.
The Argument from Accidental Truth against Deflationism.Masaharu Mizumoto - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Truth-Predicates Still Not like Pronouns: a Reply to Salis.Arvid Båve - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (5):1421-1429.
References found in this work
Relevance: Communication and Cognition.Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson - 1986/1995 - Oxford: Blackwell.
Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert Brandom - 1994 - Harvard University Press.