Trivial Languages

Acta Analytica 33 (1):1-17 (2018)
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I here present and defend what I call the Triviality Theory of Truth, to be understood in analogy with Matti Eklund’s Inconsistency Theory of Truth. A specific formulation of is defended and compared with alternatives found in the literature. A number of objections against the proposed notion of meaning-constitutivity are discussed and held inconclusive. The main focus, however, is on the problem, discussed at length by Gupta and Belnap, that speakers do not accept epistemically neutral conclusions of Curry derivations. I first argue that the facts about speakers’ reactions to such Curry derivations do not constitute a problem for the Triviality Theory specifically. Rather, they follow from independent, uncontroversial facts. I then propose a solution which coheres with the theory as I understand it. Finally, I consider a normative reading of their objection and offer a response.

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Arvid Båve
University of Lisbon

Citations of this work

Validity as Truth-Conduciveness.Arvid Båve - forthcoming - In Adam Podlaskowski & Drew Johnson (eds.), Truth 20/20. Synthese Library.

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