It Seems Like There Aren't Any Seemings

Philosophia 40 (4):771-782 (2012)
Abstract   I argue that the two primary motivations in the literature for positing seemings as sui generis mental states are insufficient to motivate this view. Because of this, epistemological views which attempt to put seemings to work don’t go far enough. It would be better to do the same work by appealing to what makes seeming talk true rather than simply appealing to seeming talk. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-12 DOI 10.1007/s11406-012-9363-8 Authors T. Ryan Byerly, Department of Philosophy, Baylor University, Waco, TX, USA Journal Philosophia Online ISSN 1574-9274 Print ISSN 0048-3893
Keywords Seemings  Phenomenal conservatism  Experiences  Inclinations
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-012-9363-8
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Huemer (2007). Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2008). Evidence. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
Tim Crane (2005). The Problem of Perception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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Chris Tucker (2011). Phenomenal Conservatism and Evidentialism in Religious Epistemology. In Kelly James Clark & Raymond J. VanArragon (eds.), Evidence and Religious Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 52--73.

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