Philosophia 40 (4):771-782 (2012)

Authors
T. Ryan Byerly
University of Sheffield
Abstract
Abstract   I argue that the two primary motivations in the literature for positing seemings as sui generis mental states are insufficient to motivate this view. Because of this, epistemological views which attempt to put seemings to work don’t go far enough. It would be better to do the same work by appealing to what makes seeming talk true rather than simply appealing to seeming talk. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-12 DOI 10.1007/s11406-012-9363-8 Authors T. Ryan Byerly, Department of Philosophy, Baylor University, Waco, TX, USA Journal Philosophia Online ISSN 1574-9274 Print ISSN 0048-3893
Keywords Seemings  Phenomenal conservatism  Experiences  Inclinations
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-012-9363-8
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References found in this work BETA

The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Mental Representation.David Pitt - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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Citations of this work BETA

Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.
Seemings as Sui Generis.Blake McAllister - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3079-3096.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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