Non-Cognitivism and Fundamental Moral Certitude: Reply to Eriksson and Francén Olinder

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):794-799 (2017)

Authors
Jonas Olson
Stockholm University
Krister Bykvist
Stockholm University
Abstract
Accommodating degrees of moral certitude is a serious problem for non-cognitivism about ethics. In particular, non-cognitivism has trouble accommodating fundamental moral certitude. John Eriksson and Ragnar Francén Olinder [2016] have recently proposed a solution. In fact, Eriksson and Francén Olinder offer two different proposals—one ‘classification’ account and one ‘projectivist’ account. We argue that the classification account faces the same problem as previous accounts do, while the projectivist account has unacceptable implications. Non-cognitivists will have to look elsewhere for a plausible solution to the problem of accommodating fundamental moral certitude.
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2016.1269352
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References found in this work BETA

Ecumenical Expressivism: The Best of Both Worlds?Michael Ridge - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2:51-76.
Normative Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists.Andrew Sepielli - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):191-207.
Expressivism and Moral Certitude.Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):202-215.
Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude.Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2):1-8.

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Citations of this work BETA

Enkrasia for Non-Cognitivists.Teemu Toppinen - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (5):943-955.

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