Philosophia 41 (1):109-125 (2013)

Authors
Nicholas K. Jones
University of Birmingham
Abstract
Unger has recently argued that if you are the only thinking and experiencing subject in your chair, then you are not a material object. This leads Unger to endorse a version of Substance Dualism according to which we are immaterial souls. This paper argues that this is an overreaction. We argue that the specifically Dualist elements of Unger’s view play no role in his response to the problem; only the view’s structure is required, and that is available to Unger’s opponents. We outline one such non-Dualist view, suggest how to resolve the dispute, respond to some objections, and argue that ours is but one of many views that survive Unger’s challenge. All these views are incompatible with microphysicalism. So Unger’s discussion does contain an insight: if you are the only conscious subject in your chair, then microphsyicalism is false. Unger’s mistake was to infer Substance Dualism from this; for microphysicalism is not the only alternative to Dualism.
Keywords Problem of the many  Constitution  Substance dualism
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-012-9384-3
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References found in this work BETA

Material Beings.Peter VAN INWAGEN - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Many, but Almost One.David K. Lewis - 1993 - In Keith Cambell, John Bacon & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D. M. Armstrong. Cambridge University Press. pp. 23-38.
Sameness and Substance Renewed.David Wiggins - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Unrestricted Animalism and the Too Many Candidates Problem.Eric Yang - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):635-652.
Multiple Constitution.Nicholas K. Jones - 2015 - In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmer (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 9. Oxford: OUP. pp. 217-261.
The Hard Problem of the Many.Jonathan A. Simon - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):449-468.

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