Alex Byrne
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Anything is similar to anything, provided the respects of similarity are allowed to be gerrymandered or gruesome, as Goodman observed.2 But similarity in non-gruesome or—as I shall say—genuine respects is much less ecumenical. Colors, it seems, provide a compelling illustration of the distinction as applied to similarities among properties.3 For instance, in innumerable gruesome respects, blue is more similar to yellow than to purple. But in a genuine respect, blue is more similar to purple than to yellow (genuinely more similar, as I shall sometimes put it)
Keywords Color  Epistemology  Perception  Similarity  Kripke, S  Lewis, D  Walker, R
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00282.x
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The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.

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