Dialectica 60 (2):223-44 (2006)

Authors
Alex Byrne
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
b>: there is no “mind-body problem”, or “hard problem of consciousness”; if there is a hard problem of something, it is the problem of reconciling the manifest and scientific images
Keywords Body  Color  Consciousness  Metaphysics  Minds
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01061.x
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References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.

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Citations of this work BETA

Color Pluralism.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):563-601.
Color Primitivism.David R. Hilbert & Alex Byrne - 2006 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):73 - 105.
Possibility and Imagination.Alex Byrne - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):125–144.
The Multiply Qualitative.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):239-262.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

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