Philosophical Studies 178 (9):3017-3026 (2020)

Authors
Alex Byrne
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
This comment mainly examines Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s preferred framework for examining whether narrow content is viable, arguing that their framework is not well-suited to the task; once a more traditional framework is adopted, Y&H’s case against internalism is strengthened.
Keywords narrow content  internalism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-020-01548-2
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References found in this work BETA

Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2009 - Oxford University Press UK.
The Logical Form of Action Sentences.Donald Davidson - 1967 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 81--95.
Narrow Content.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & John Hawthorne - 2018 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Reply to Byrne.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & John Hawthorne - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):3049-3054.
Narrow Mental Content.Curtis Brown - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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