Color realism and color science

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21 (2003)
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Abstract

The target article is an attempt to make some progress on the problem of color realism. Are objects colored? And what is the nature of the color properties? We defend the view that physical objects (for instance, tomatoes, radishes, and rubies) are colored, and that colors are physical properties, specifically types of reflectance. This is probably a minority opinion, at least among color scientists. Textbooks frequently claim that physical objects are not colored, and that the colors are "subjective" or "in the mind." The article has two other purposes: first, to introduce an interdisciplinary audience to some distinctively philosophical tools that are useful in tackling the problem of color realism and, second, to clarify the various positions and central arguments in the debate.

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Author Profiles

Alex Byrne
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
David R. Hilbert
University of Illinois, Chicago

Citations of this work

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