Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):791-793 (2003)

Authors
David R. Hilbert
University of Illinois, Chicago
Abstract
Our reply is in four parts. The first part, R1, addresses objections to our claim that there might be “unknowable” color facts. The second part, R2, discusses the use we make of opponent process theory. The third part, R3, examines the question of whether colors are causes. The fourth part, R4, takes up some issues concerning the content of visual experience.
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x03270187
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References found in this work BETA

Consciousness Explained.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):424.
Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
Mental Causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Contents of Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Color Primitivism.David R. Hilbert & Alex Byrne - 2006 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):73 - 105.
Afterimages and Sensation.Ian Phillips - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):417-453.
Fitting Color Into the Physical World.Peter W. Ross - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):575-599.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

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