Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):238--45 (2001)
Dispositional theories of colour have been attacked by McGinn and others on the ground that ‘Colours do not look like dispositions’. Langsam has argued that on the contrary they do, in ‘Why Colours Do Look Like Dispositions’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 50 , pp. 68–75. I make three claims. First, neither side has made its case. Secondly, it is true, at least on one interpretation, that colours do not look like dispositions. Thirdly, this does not show that dispositionalism about colours is false
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Color Primitivism.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2006 - In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Erkenntnis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 73 - 105.
Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.
Similar books and articles
Seeing Red: The Metaphysics of Colours Without the Physics.Michael Watkins - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):33-52.
Philosophical Issues About Colour Vision.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2002 - In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
Causation, Laws and Dispositions.Andreas Hüttemann - 2007 - In Max Kistler & Bruno Gnassounou (eds.), Dispositions and Causal Powers. Ashgate.
Why Colours Do Look Like Dispositions.Harold Langsam - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):68-75.
Novel Colours and the Content of Experience.Fiona Macpherson - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):43-66.
The Conditional Analysis of Dispositions and the Intrinsic Dispositions Thesis.Sungho Choi - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):568-590.
Added to index2009-04-06
Total downloads11 ( #406,927 of 2,177,988 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #317,698 of 2,177,988 )
How can I increase my downloads?