Either/or

In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 314-19 (2008)
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Abstract

This essay surveys the varieties of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. Disjunctivism comes in two main ?avours, metaphysical and epistemological. Metaphysical disjunctivism is the view usually associated with the disjunctivist label, and whenever

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original Byrne, Alex; Logue, Heather (2008) "Either/or". In Haddock, Adrian, Macpherson, Fiona, Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge, pp. : Oxford University Press (2008)

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Either/or.Alex Byrne - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Author Profiles

Alex Byrne
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Heather Logue
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Desire-Based Theories of Reasons and the Guise of the Good.Kael McCormack - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (47):1288-1321.
Acquiring a Concept of Visual Experience.Austin Andrews - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):223-245.
A Disjunctive Account of Desire.Kael McCormack - 2022 - Dissertation, University of New South Wales

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