Interpretivism

Authors
Alex Byrne
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
In the writings of Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson we find something like the following bold conjecture: it is an a priori truth that there is no gap between our best judgements of a subject's beliefs and desires and the truth about the subject's beliefs and desires. Under ideal conditions a subject's belief-box and desire-box become transparent.
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Must Rational Intentions Maximize Utility?Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):73-92.
Interpreting Thomas Kuhn as a Response-Dependence Theorist.Nathaniel Goldberg - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (5):729 - 752.
The Metaphysics of Meaning: Hopkins on Wittgenstein.Steven Gross - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (4):518-538.

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