Kant's Compatibilism in the New Eludication of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition

Kant Studien 99 (1):68-79 (2008)
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Abstract

1. Introduction It is generally assumed that, during his early pre-critical phase, Kant accepted a Leibnizian account of freedom according to which we are free to do otherwise than we do even though our actions are determined. This assumption is false. Far from endorsing such an account, Kant explicitly argues in the New Elucidation of the First Principle of Metaphysical Cognition that there is no relevant sense in which we can do otherwise than we do. Nevertheless, he is equally convinced that we are free and responsible for our actions. And so he concludes that we can be responsible for what we do even if we could not have done otherwise. Little attention, however, has been paid to this argument. This is unfortunate, since a better understanding of this stage in Kant's theory of freedom would surely help us in understanding the later critical developments. This paper seeks to remedy this deficiency

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2009-01-28

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Jeremy Byrd
Tarrant County College

Citations of this work

A remark on Kant's argument from incongruent counterparts.Jeremy Byrd - 2008 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (4):789 – 800.
Kant-Bibliographie 2008.Margit Ruffing - 2010 - Kant Studien 101 (4):487-538.

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