Knowing what I want
In JeeLoo Liu & John Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press (2011)
Abstract
How do you know what you want? The question is neglected by epistemologists. This paper attempts an answer.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Transparency, belief, intention.Alex Byrne - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85:201-21.
Might Desires Be Beliefs About Normative Reasons?Alex Gregory - 2017 - In Julien Deonna & Federico Lauria (eds.), The Nature of Desire. Oxford University Press. pp. 201-217.
Deep, dark…or transparent? Knowing our desires.Lauren Ashwell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):245-256.
Embedded mental action in self-attribution of belief.Antonia Peacocke - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):353-377.