Logoi 39 (23):17-28 (2021)

Nick Byrd
Stevens Institute of Technology
Some have argued that our sense of free will is an illusion. And some base this free will skepticism on claims about when we become consciously aware of our intentions. Evidence suggests that unreflective intentions form before we are conscious of them. And that is supposed to challenge our sense of free will. This inference from unreflective intention to free will skepticism may seem intuitive at first. However, upon reflection, this argument seems to entail a magical view of free will. So, insofar as free will does not require magic, unreflective intentions do not necessarily undermine our sense of free will.
Keywords reflection  intention  free will  neuroscience  philosophy of mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,231
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Testing Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2010 - Neuroethics 3 (2):161-172.
Libet's Impossible Demand.Neil Levy - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):67-76.
Libet and the Case for Free Will Scepticism.Tim Bayne - 2011 - In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science. Oup/British Academy.
Libet-Like Experiments and the Efficacy of the Will.Sofia Bonicalzi - 2015 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 6 (1):130-144.
Are Intentions in Tension with Timing Experiments?Marcela Herdova - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):573-587.
Free Will as a Skill.John Riser - 2015 - Think 14 (39):87-94.
Free Will and Neuroscience.Alfred Mele - 2013 - Philosophic Exchange 43 (1).


Added to PP index

Total views
32 ( #342,577 of 2,455,388 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
32 ( #24,241 of 2,455,388 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes