Authors
Alex Byrne
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
One very popular framework in contemporary epistemology is Bayesian. The central epistemic state is subjective confidence, or credence. Traditional epistemic states like belief and knowledge tend to be sidelined, or even dispensed with entirely. Credences are often introduced as familiar mental states, merely in need of a special label for the purposes of epistemology. But whether they are implicitly recognized by the folk or posits of a sophisticated scientific psychology, they do not appear to fit well with perception, as is often noted. This paper investigates the tension between probabilistic cognition and non-probabilistic perception. The tension is real, and the solution—to adapt a phrase from Quine and Goodman—is to renounce credences altogether.
Keywords Credence, degree of belief, Bayesian, perception
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12768
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - University of Chicago Press.

View all 108 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Consequences of Comparability.Cian Dorr, Jake Nebel & Jake Zuehl - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.
Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.
Why Credences Are Not Beliefs.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Perception and Belief.A. D. Smith - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):283-309.
Troubles for Bayesian Formal Epistemology.Terry Horgan - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):233-255.
Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference.Jan Sprenger - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (2):319-335.
Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
Perception and Belief.A. D. Smith - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):283-309.
If Perception is Probabilistic, Why Doesn't It Seem Probabilistic?Ned Block - 2018 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 373 (1755).
Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
Accuracy for Believers.Julia Staffel - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):39-48.
Bayesian Epistemology.Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger - 2010 - In Duncan Pritchard & Sven Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. London: Routledge. pp. 609-620.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-02-21

Total views
292 ( #29,792 of 2,432,203 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
292 ( #1,515 of 2,432,203 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes