Alex Byrne
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
David Rosenthal couples his higher-order thought theory of consciousness with a theory of “mental qualities”, properties of mental states. The first thesis of this paper is that there are no mental qualities as Rosenthal conceives of them. The second thesis is that Rosenthal’s residual insights are significant. They naturally lead to a simple first-order theory of consciousness.
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References found in this work BETA

Consciousness and Mind.David Rosenthal - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.
Two Concepts of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.

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