Truest blue

Analysis 67 (1):87-92 (2007)
1. The “puzzle” Physical objects are coloured: roses are red, violets are blue, and so forth. In particular, physical objects have fine-grained shades of colour: a certain chip, we can suppose, is true blue (unique, or pure blue). The following sort of scenario is commonplace. The chip looks true blue to John; in the same (ordinary) viewing conditions it looks (slightly) greenish-blue to Jane. Both John and Jane are “normal” perceivers. Now, nothing can be both true blue and greenish-blue; since the chip is true blue, it is not greenish-blue. Hence Jane, unlike John, is misperceiving the chip. Generalizing, the conclusion is that there is widespread misperception of fine-grained shades. According to Tye (2006), and Cohen, Hardin, and McLaughlin (2006), the previous paragraph amounts to a paradox: an apparently unacceptable conclusion has been drawn from apparently acceptable premises via apparently acceptable reasoning. (See also Hawthorne and Kovakovich 2006, 180-1.) Tye swallows the conclusion, aided by a dose of evolutionary speculation. Hardin (1988), on the other hand, rejects the first premise, and denies that physical objects are coloured. Cohen (2004) and McLaughlin (2003) claim that both Jane and John have the colour of the chip right. Our opening paragraph concealed a crucial parameter. In fact, the chip looks greenish-blue-relative-tocircumstances-C to Jane, and true-blue-relative-to-circumstances-C* to John, and the chip has both these relativized colours.1 All this ingenious philosophizing would be in vain, of course, if the conclusion of the opening paragraph were not puzzling or problematic. So, why is it supposed to be? According to Tye, the conclusion is puzzling because John and Jane are both “normal perceivers” (xx). He seems to think that it is (prima facie) plausible to assume..
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00654.x
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References found in this work BETA
Color Realism and Color Science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
The Puzzle of True Blue.Michael Tye - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):173–178.
Color, Consciousness, and Color Consciousness.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 97-154.
Disjunctivism.John Hawthorne & Scott Sturgeon - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80 (1):145-216.

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Citations of this work BETA
What's That Smell?Clare Batty - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):321-348.
Colour.Laura Gow - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (11):803-813.
Tye's Missing Shade of Blue.Timm Triplett - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):166–170.

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Blue Chip Review.Lloyd Kurtz - 1996 - Business Ethics 10 (2):52-52.
Continuity and the Logic of Perception.John L. Bell - 2000 - Transcendent Philosophy 1 (2):1-7.
The Truth About True Blue.Michael Tye - 2006 - Analysis 66 (4):340–344.
True Colours.Jonathan Cohen, C. L. Hardin & Brian P. McLaughlin - 2006 - Analysis 66 (4):335-340.
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