The necessity of tomorrow's sea battle

Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):160-176 (2010)
Abstract
In chapter 9 of De Interpretatione, Aristotle offers a defense of free will against the threat of fatalism. According to the traditional interpretation, Aristotle concedes the validity of the fatalist's arguments and then proceeds to reject the Principle of Bivalence in order to avoid the fatalist's conclusion. Assuming that the traditional interpretation is right on this point, it remains to be seen why Aristotle felt compelled to reject such an intuitive semantic principle rather than challenge the fatalist's inference from truth to necessity. The answer, I contend, lies in Aristotle's theory of truth and truthmakers
Keywords Aristotle  Future Contingents  Bivalence  Fatalism  Truth  Truthmakers  Sea Battle  De Interpretatione
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2010.01011.x
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Causality and Determinism.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1971 - Cambridge University Press.

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