Sentence, proposition and identity

Synthese 154 (3):371 - 382 (2007)
Abstract
In this paper we discuss the distinction between sentence and proposition from the perspective of identity. After criticizing Quine, we discuss how objects of logical languages are constructed, explaining what is Kleene’s congruence—used by Bourbaki with his square—and Paul Halmos’s view about the difference between formulas and objects of the factor structure, the corresponding boolean algebra, in case of classical logic. Finally we present Patrick Suppes’s congruence approach to the notion of proposition, according to which a whole hierarchy of congruences leads to different kinds of objects.
Keywords Sentence  Proposition  Formula  Syntax  Language  Identity  Congruence
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-006-9124-y
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Drei Briefe an Otto Neurath.Alfred Tarski - 1992 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 43:1-32.
Logic May Be Simple. Logic, Congruence and Algebra.Jean-Yves Béziau - 1997 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 5:129-147.

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