Species Pluralism: Conceptual, Ontological, and Practical Dimensions


Authors
Justin Bzovy
Grant MacEwan University
Abstract
Species are central to biology, but there is currently no agreement on what the adequate species concept should be, and many have adopted a pluralist stance: different species concepts will be required for different purposes. This thesis is a multidimensional analysis of species pluralism. First I explicate how pluralism differs monism and relativism. I then consider the history of species pluralism. I argue that we must re-frame the species problem, and that re-evaluating Aristotle's role in the histories of systematics can shed light on pluralism. Next I consider different forms of pluralism: evolutionary and extra-evolutionary species pluralism, which differ in their stance on evolutionary theory. I show that pluralism is more than a debate about the species category, but a debate about which concepts are legitimate and a claim about how they interact with one another. Following that, I consider what sort of ontology is required for different forms of species pluralism. I argue that pluralists who deny the unity of biology will require a further plurality of frameworks, while those that ground their pluralism in evolution need only one framework. Finally, I consider what pluralism means for biological practice. I argue that species concepts are tools, and reflect on how pluralism can illuminate the way systematists approach the discovery of new species of yeast. Pluralism can make sense of the way species concepts are used, and can be developed to aid researchers in thinking about how to use the right tools for the right jobs.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 39,566
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Doing Without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Animal Species and Evolution.Ernst Mayr - 1963 - Belknap of Harvard University Press.

View all 151 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Species Pluralism Does Not Imply Species Eliminativism.Ingo Brigandt - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1305–1316.
Species Pluralism and Anti-Realism.Marc Ereshefsky - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (1):103-120.
Eliminative Pluralism.Marc Ereshefsky - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (4):671-690.
Species Pluralism.John Alan Holmes - 2000 - Dissertation, Michigan State University
On the Nature of the Species Problem and the Four Meanings of 'Species'.Thomas A. C. Reydon - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 36 (1):135-158.
For Pluralism and Against Realism About Species.P. Kyle Stanford - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (1):70-91.
On the Failure of Modern Species Concepts.Jody Hey - 2006 - Trends in Ecology and Evolution 21 (8):447-450.
Art Concept Pluralism.Christy Mag Uidhir & P. D. Magnus - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):83-97.
How to Be a Function Pluralist.Justin Garson - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):1101-1122.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-08-30

Total views
7 ( #796,228 of 2,325,876 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #416,543 of 2,325,876 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature