El nuevo enigma de la inducción y los términos de clase natural (The New Riddle of Induction and Natural Kind Terms)

Critica 34 (100):55 - 85 (2002)
Abstract
En este ensayo intento mostrar el estrecho vínculo entre el asunto de la fijación de la extensión de los términos de clase natural y el problema de la proyectabilidad puesto de relieve por Goodman con su nuevo enigma de la inducción. Por un lado argumento que el nuevo enigma de la inducción pone de manifiesto la presencia de un elemento fregeano en la teoría de la referencia directa de Putnam y, por el otro, señalo la necesidad de que una respuesta realista a dicho enigma se articule con una tesis epistemológica de cómo conocemos las presuntas propiedades intrínsecas de los objetos. /// This paper intends to show the tight link between the question of fixation of extension of natural kind terms and the problem of projectibility pointed out by Goodman's new riddle of induction. I will argue that, on the one hand, the new riddle of induction enables us to show that Putnam's theory of reference has a Fregean element. On the other, I will point out that a realist answer to the new riddle must be articulated with an epistemological thesis about our knowledge of pretended intrinsic properties of objects.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,545
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-05-29

Total downloads
31 ( #203,764 of 2,287,884 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #124,964 of 2,287,884 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature