Credence in the Image of Chance

Philosophy of Science 82 (4):626-648 (2015)
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Abstract

In this article, I consider what sorts of chance credence norms can be justified by appeal to the idea that ideal credences should line up with the chances. I argue that the Principal Principle cannot be so justified but that an alternative norm, the Temporal Principle—which maintains that an agent’s credence in a proposition ϕ, conditional on the temporal proposition that says that the chance of ϕ is x, should be x—can be so justified.

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Michael Caie
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

References found in this work

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
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Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James M. Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese. pp. 263-297.
Correcting the guide to objective chance.Ned Hall - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):505-518.
Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.

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