Philosophical Explorations 7 (1):1-20 (2004)

Radical Concept Nativism (RCN) is the doctrine that most of our concepts are innate. In this paper I will argue in favour of RCN by developing a speculative account of concept acquisition that has considerable nativist credentials and can be defended against the most familiar anti-nativist objections. The core idea is that we have a whole battery of hard-wired dispositions that determine how we group together objects with which we interact. In having these dispositions we are effectively committed to an implicit conceptual scheme and acquiring concepts is a matter of labelling the elements of that scheme
Keywords Concept  Epistemology  Innate Idea  Language  Nativism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/1386979032000186827
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,379
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
The Language of Thought.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - Critica 10 (28):140-143.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
88 ( #134,019 of 2,519,678 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #406,314 of 2,519,678 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes