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Ratio 29 (1):1-10 (2016)
Authors
Achille C. Varzi
Columbia University
Claudio Calosi
Université de Genève
Abstract
This is a brief sequel to Max Black 's classic dialogue on the Identity of Indiscernibles. Interlocutor A defends the bundle theory by endorsing the view according to which Black 's world does not contain two indiscernible spheres but rather a single, bi-located sphere. His opponent, B, objects that A cannot distinguish such a world from a world with a single, uniquely located sphere, hence that the view in question adds nothing to A's original response to Black 's challenge. A is simply denying that there can be worlds with two or more indiscernible entities
Keywords Max Black  Identity of Insiscernibles  Multi-location  Bundle theory
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Reprint years 2014, 2016
DOI 10.1111/rati.12082
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Location and Mereology.Cody Gilmore - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A New Universal Bundle Theory.Ruoyu Zhang - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (2):473-486.

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