Further clarification on permissive and instructive causes

Biology and Philosophy 34 (5):50 (2019)
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Abstract

I respond to recent criticism of my analysis of the permissive-instructive distinction and outline problems with the alternative analysis on offer. Amongst other problems, I argue that the use of formal measures is unclear and unmotivated, that the distinction is conflated with others that are not equivalent, and that no good reasons are provided for thinking the alternative model or formal measure tracks what biologists are interested in. I also clarify my own analysis where it has been misunderstood or ignored.

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10.1007/s10539-019-9700-4

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Brett Calcott
University of Sydney

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References found in this work

Variation of information as a measure of one-to-one causal specificity.Pierrick Bourrat - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):1-18.
Variation of information as a measure of one-to-one causal specificity.Pierrick Bourrat - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):11.

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