Synthese:1-17 (forthcoming)

Claudio Calosi
Université de Genève
According to the Determinable Based Account of metaphysical indeterminacy, there is MI when there is an indeterminate state of affairs, roughly a state of affairs in which a constituent object x has a determinable property but fails to have a unique determinate of that determinable. There are different ways in which x might have a determinable but no unique determinate: x has no determinate—gappy MI, or x has more than one determinate—glutty MI. Talk of determinables and determinates is usually constructed as relative to levels of determination. In this paper I first provide a formal construction for determinables and determinates that pays crucial attention to intermediate levels of determination, and then explore the consequences for the DBA of introducing such intermediate levels. In particular, I argue that intermediate levels of determination highlight crucial differences between gappy and glutty cases of MI, and allow one to introduce a third way of indeterminacy, glappy MI.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-021-03291-5
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