Measures, explanations and the past: Should ‘special’ initial conditions be explained?

Authors
Craig Callender
University of California, San Diego
Abstract
For the generalizations of thermodynamics to obtain, it appears that a very ‘special’ initial condition of the universe is required. Is this initial condition itself in need of explanation? I argue that it is not. In so doing, I offer a framework in which to think about ‘special’ initial conditions in all areas of science, though I concentrate on the case of thermodynamics. I urge the view that it is not always a serious mark against a theory that it must posit an ‘improbable’ initial condition.
Keywords thermodynamics  initial conditions  cosmology
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/55.2.195
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An Empirical Approach to Symmetry and Probability.Jill North - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41 (1):27-40.
Chance, Possibility, and Explanation.N. Emery - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):95-120.

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