Social–Theoretical Holism, Practises, and Apriorism: A Reply to Grasswick

Social Epistemology 25 (4):371 - 378 (2011)

Authors
Chris Calvert-Minor
University of Wisconsin-Whitewater
Abstract
In Heidi Grasswick?s response to ??Epistemological communities? and the problem of epistemic agency,? she criticizes my move to reconceptualize epistemology as an affair primarily centered on epistemic practises instead of epistemic agency. In this paper, I address some of Grasswick?s counterpoints, and I restate my argument for why epistemology should be centered on practises instead of epistemic agency. However, to advance the discussion, I urge that a more fruitful dialogue would engage looking at what consequences and advantages might follow from reframing epistemology around practises. Therefore, I entertain an additional advantage this turn to practises makes regarding the danger of apriorism, the prior construction and application of theoretical structures upon groups of people and their practises without consideration for the actuality of these people and their practises. I argue that reorientating one?s epistemology around practises gives adequate grounds to avoid aprioristic tendencies, whereas an epistemology primarily centered on epistemic agency can fall into trouble
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DOI 10.1080/02691728.2011.604449
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References found in this work BETA

A New Societist Social Ontology.Theodore R. Schatzki - 2003 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (2):174-202.
Pragmatism and Realism.Frederick L. Will - 1996 - Rowman & Littlefied Publishers.
The "Strong Programme", Normativity, and Social Causes.Chris Calvert-Minor - 2008 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38 (1):1–22.

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