Accurate Updating for the Risk Sensitive

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (3):751-776 (2020)
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Abstract

Philosophers have recently attempted to justify particular belief revision procedures by arguing that they are the optimal means towards the epistemic end of accurate credences. These attempts, however, presuppose that means should be evaluated according to classical expected utility theory; and there is a long tradition maintaining that expected utility theory is too restrictive as a theory of means–end rationality, ruling out too many natural ways of taking risk into account. In this paper, we investigate what belief-revision procedures are supported by accuracy-theoretic considerations once we depart from expected utility theory to allow agents to be risk-sensitive. We argue that if accuracy-theoretic considerations tell risk-sensitive agents anything about belief-revision, they tell them the same thing they tell risk-neutral agents: they should conditionalize.

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Author Profiles

Catrin Campbell-Moore
University of Bristol
Bernhard Salow
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Avoiding Risk and Avoiding Evidence.Catrin Campbell-Moore & Bernhard Salow - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):495-515.
Risk-Limited Indulgent Permissivism.Guy Axtell - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-15.
Risk-limited indulgent permissivism.Guy Axtell - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-15.

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