Consciousness and content-formation

Abstract
How can materialists begin to do justice to the experiencing subject? Some materialists, whom I call ?structuralists?, believe that the brain sciences offer at least the distant prospect of a materialist psychology with an experiencing subject. Others, and notably those materialists who are functionalists, believe that this faith is misplaced, and offer us instead a functional psychology. I argue, briefly, that functionalism cannot deliver the goods, and go on to elaborate and defend the structuralist claim that consciousness or experience is the formation of content conceived as that laying down of traces commonly assumed to be involved in perception and cognition
Keywords Consciousness  Content Analysis  Epistemology  Structuralism
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DOI 10.1080/00201748408602026
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References found in this work BETA
A Perspective on Mind-Brain Research.Patricia S. Churchland - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (April):185-207.
The Nature of Mind.David M. Armstrong - 1970 - In Clive V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.
Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (October):249-261.

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A Complex Systems Theory of Teleology.Wayne Christensen - 1996 - Biology and Philosophy 11 (3):301-320.

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