Consciousness and content-formation

How can materialists begin to do justice to the experiencing subject? Some materialists, whom I call ?structuralists?, believe that the brain sciences offer at least the distant prospect of a materialist psychology with an experiencing subject. Others, and notably those materialists who are functionalists, believe that this faith is misplaced, and offer us instead a functional psychology. I argue, briefly, that functionalism cannot deliver the goods, and go on to elaborate and defend the structuralist claim that consciousness or experience is the formation of content conceived as that laying down of traces commonly assumed to be involved in perception and cognition
Keywords Consciousness  Content Analysis  Epistemology  Structuralism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00201748408602026
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 36,528
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

A Perspective on Mind-Brain Research.Patricia S. Churchland - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (April):185-207.
The Nature of Mind.David M. Armstrong - 1970 - In Clive V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.
Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (October):249-261.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A Complex Systems Theory of Teleology.Wayne Christensen - 1996 - Biology and Philosophy 11 (3):301-320.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total downloads
41 ( #159,410 of 2,302,397 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #272,888 of 2,302,397 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature