Explanatory epiphenomenalism

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):437-451 (2005)
Abstract
I propose a new form of epiphenomenalism, 'explanatory epiphenomenalism', the view that the identification of A's mental properties does not provide a causal explanation of A's behaviour. I arrive at this view by showing that although anomalous monism does not entail type epiphenomenalism (despite what many of Davidson's critics have suggested), it does (when coupled with some additional claims) lead to the conclusion that the identification of A's reasons does not causally explain A's behaviour. I then formalize this view and show that it is an attractive position, because it captures the insights of existing forms of epiphenomenalism without their onerous metaphysical commitments
Keywords Causality  Epiphenomenalism  Explanation  Metaphysics  Mind  Campbell, Keith
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00409.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,195
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (February):67-90.
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?Colin McGinn - 1989 - Mind 98 (July):349-66.

View all 22 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
In Defence of Qualia-Epiphenomenalism.Volker Gadenne - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):101-114.
A New Epiphenomenalism?Mark B. Woodhouse - 1974 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (August):163-69.
Why Davidson is Not a Property Epiphenomenalist.Sophie Gibb - 2006 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407 – 422.
Comments On: Mark Woodhouse, A New Epiphenomenalism?.Keith Campbell - 1974 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (August):170-173.
Is There a Problem in Physicalist Epiphenomenalism?Amir Horowitz - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):421-34.
Epiphenomenalism and Content.Mark Eli Kalderon - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 52 (July):71-90.
Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism.Rex Welshon - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):103-120.
What Was Huxley's Epiphenomenalism?Neil Campbell - 2001 - Biology and Philosophy 16 (3):357-375.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

68 ( #76,711 of 2,163,974 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #348,017 of 2,163,974 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums