Epistemic Error and Experiential Evidence

In Glimpse: Publication of the Society of Phenomenology and Media (2012)
Abstract
In response to recent debates in color ontology, I present an account of color that resolves the issue in a new way by conceiving of colors as properties of appearances. Appearances are both objective and subjective: they are real-world events reducible to psychophysical interactions involving environmental stimuli and experiential states. The case is made for accepting experience as an actual component of colors themselves as well as being the fundamental epistemic evidence for their instantiation.
Keywords color properties  color appearances  color experience  correspondence theory of truth
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