Generalizing qualia inversion

Erkenntnis 60 (1):27-34 (2004)
Abstract
Philosophers who advocate the possibility of spectrum inversion often conclude that the qualitative content of experiential states pose a serious problem for functionalism. I argue that in order for the inversion hypothesis to support this conclusion one needs to show that it generalizes to all species of qualia. By examining features of touch, taste, and olfactory sensations, I show there is good reason to resist this generalization, in which case appeals to the possibility of spectral inversion are considerably less effective than they may initially appear
Keywords Experience  Functionalism  Inversion  Metaphysics  Qualia
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DOI 10.1023/B:ERKE.0000005130.65887.1a
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