How to Express Self-Referential Probability. A Kripkean Proposal

Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):680-704 (2015)
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Abstract

We present a semantics for a language that includes sentences that can talk about their own probabilities. This semantics applies a fixed point construction to possible world style structures. One feature of the construction is that some sentences only have their probability given as a range of values. We develop a corresponding axiomatic theory and show by a canonical model construction that it is complete in the presence of the ω-rule. By considering this semantics we argue that principles such as introspection, which lead to paradoxical contradictions if naively formulated, should be expressed by using a truth predicate to do the job of quotation and disquotation and observe that in the case of introspection the principle is then consistent.

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Catrin Campbell-Moore
University of Bristol

Citations of this work

A Tale of Two Epistemologies?Alan Hájek & Hanti Lin - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):207-232.
Knowledge of Our Own Beliefs.Sherrilyn Roush - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):45-69.
A Tale of Two Epistemologies?Alan H.\'aje & Hanti Lin - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):207-232.

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References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Model Theory.Michael Makkai, C. C. Chang & H. J. Keisler - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (3):1096.
Axiomatic Theories of Truth.Volker Halbach - 2010 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Axiomatic theories of truth.Volker Halbach - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Model Theory.C. C. Chang & H. Jerome Keisler - 1992 - Studia Logica 51 (1):154-155.

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