How to have a radically minimal ontology
Philosophical Studies 151 (2):249 - 264 (2010)
Abstract
In this paper I further elucidate and defend a metaontological position that allows you to have a minimal ontology without embracing an error-theory of ordinary talk. On this view 'there are Fs' can be strictly and literally true without bringing an ontological commitment to Fs. Instead of a sentence S committing you to the things that must be amongst the values of the variables if it is true, I argue that S commits you to the things that must exist as truthmakers for S if it is true. I rebut some recent objections that have been levelled against this metaontological viewAuthor's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s11098-009-9442-2
My notes
Similar books and articles
There are No Things That are Musical Works.Ross P. Cameron - 2008 - British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (3):295-314.
The Anatomy of the Image: Toward an Applied Onto-Psychiatry.James M. Fielding & Dirk Marwede - 2011 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (4):287-303.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-05-13
Downloads
577 (#16,903)
6 months
15 (#67,058)
2009-05-13
Downloads
577 (#16,903)
6 months
15 (#67,058)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
What Not to Multiply Without Necessity.Jonathan Schaffer - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):644-664.
Building the world from its fundamental constituents.L. A. Paul - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):221-256.
The Narrow Ontic Counterfactual Account of Distinctively Mathematical Explanation.Mark Povich - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2):511-543.
Fundamental Quantification and the Language of the Ontology Room.Daniel Z. Korman - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):298-321.
References found in this work
New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
New Work For a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - In D. H. Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. Oxford University Press.
Ontological realism.Theodore Sider - 2009 - In David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 384--423.