Is causation necessary for what matters in survival?

Philosophical Studies 126 (3):375-396 (2005)
Abstract
In this paper I shall argue that if the Parfitian psychological criterion or theory of personal identity is true, then a good case can be made out to show that the psychological theorist should accept the view I call “psychological sequentialism”. This is the view that a causal connection is not necessary for what matters in survival, as long as certain other conditions are met. I argue this by way of Parfit’s own principle that what matters in survival cannot depend upon a trivial fact
Keywords Causation  Metaphysics  Personal Identity  Psychology  Survival  Parfit, Derek
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-004-7786-1
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Persons and Their Pasts.Sydney Shoemaker - 1970 - American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (4):269-85.
Persons and Substances.Scott Campbell - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 104 (3):253-267.

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Against Psychological Sequentialism.Huiyuhl Yi - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (2):247-262.

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