Philosophical Studies 126 (3):375-396 (2005)

Abstract
In this paper I shall argue that if the Parfitian psychological criterion or theory of personal identity is true, then a good case can be made out to show that the psychological theorist should accept the view I call “psychological sequentialism”. This is the view that a causal connection is not necessary for what matters in survival, as long as certain other conditions are met. I argue this by way of Parfit’s own principle that what matters in survival cannot depend upon a trivial fact
Keywords Causation  Metaphysics  Personal Identity  Psychology  Survival  Parfit, Derek
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-004-7786-1
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Persons and Their Pasts.Sydney Shoemaker - 1970 - American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (4):269-85.

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Citations of this work BETA

Boltzmannian Immortality.Christian Loew - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):761-776.
Delayed Fission and the Standard Psychological View of Personal Identity.Huiyuhl Yi - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (2):173-191.
Against Psychological Sequentialism.Huiyuhl Yi - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (2):247-262.
Is Psychology What Matters in Survival?Johan E. Gustafsson - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):504-516.

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