Kim on Reductive Explanation

Acta Analytica 30 (2):149-156 (2015)
Authors
Neil Campbell
Wilfrid Laurier University
Abstract
In the light of what appear to be clear counterexamples, I argue that Jaegwon Kim’s comparative evaluation of functional reduction and reduction via necessary identities is problematic. I trace the problem to two sources: a misplaced metaphysical assumption about the explanatory role of identities and an excessively strong and narrow criterion for successful reductive explanation. Appreciating where Kim’s critique runs astray enhances our understanding of the role of necessary identities in reductive explanation
Keywords Reduction  Reductive explanation  Explanatory realism  Functional reduction  Identities
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-014-0240-x
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References found in this work BETA

Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
Sensations and Brain Processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.

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