Manipulating colour: Pounding an Almond

In T. S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 31--48 (2006)
It seems a compelling idea that experience of colour plays some role in our having concepts of the various colours, but in trying to explain the role experience plays the first thing we have to describe is what sort of colour experience matters here. I will argue that the kind of experience that matters is conscious attention to the colours of objects as an aspect of them on which direct intervention is selectively possible. As I will explain this idea, it is a matter of being able to use experience to inform linguistic or conceptual thought about what would happen were there to be various interventions on an object. Against this background, I will review Locke’s fundamental argument that since we can change the colour of an almond by pounding it, there must be an error embodied in our ordinary concepts of colour: there is no such thing as intervening directly on the colour of an object. The analysis I present brings out the force of Locke’s argument. But I will propose a vindication of our commonsense conception of colour as an aspect of objects on which direct intervention is selectively possible
Keywords Causation  Color  Concept  Perception
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Keith Allen (2007). The Mind-Independence of Colour. European Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):137–158.
Hagit Benbaji (2015). Why Colour Primitivism? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):243-265.

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