Moral Reasoning on the Ground

Ethics 122 (2):273-312 (2012)
Authors
Victor Kumar
Boston University
Abstract
We present a unified empirical and philosophical account of moral consistency reasoning, a distinctive form of moral reasoning that exposes inconsistencies among moral judgments about concrete cases. Judgments opposed in belief or in emotion and motivation are inconsistent when the cases are similar in morally relevant respects. Moral consistency reasoning, we argue, regularly shapes moral thought and feeling by coordinating two systems described in dual process models of moral cognition. Our empirical explanation of moral change fills a gap in the empirical literature, making psychologically plausible a defensible new model of justified moral change and a hybrid theory of moral judgment.
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DOI 10.1086/663980
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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Judgment as a Natural Kind.Victor Kumar - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2887-2910.
Honor and Moral Revolution.Victor Kumar & Richmond Campbell - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):147-59.
Altruism, Egoism, or Neither: A Cognitive-Efficiency-Based Evolutionary Biological Perspective on Helping Behavior.Armin W. Schulz - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 56:15-23.
Reflective Equilibrium and Moral Consistency Reasoning.Richmond Campbell - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):1-19.
Moral-Epistemic Enhancement.Norbert Paulo - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83:165-188.

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